Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) was a German lawyer, political theorist, and member of the Nazi Party. He studied law in Berlin, Munich, and Strasbourg, taught at a number of universities, and wrote on dictatorship, political theology, and the concept of the political. He supported Hitler's regime but was forced to resign from political office in 1936 under pressure from the SS, although Göring provided him with protection.
After World War II, Schmitt refused denazification and lost his right to hold academic positions, but continued to pursue his academic career. His writings, such as Theory of the Partisan, analyzed issues of political power, authoritarianism, and criticized liberalism and parliamentarianism. However, his ideas remain controversial because of his association with Nazism. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes, Schmitt astutely criticized the weaknesses of liberal democracy, but the alternatives he proposed were far worse.
↑ Schmitt's views on dictatorship
In a paper (“Dictatorship”), Carl Schmitt analyzed the constitution of the Weimar Republic, focusing on the power of the president to declare an exceptional state. Schmitt viewed these powers as necessary for good governance, contrasting them with the ineffectiveness of parliamentary deliberation. He sought to demystify the concept of “dictatorship,” believing that it was inherent in any determined exercise of state power that bypassed democratic norms.
Schmitt argued that true sovereignty lies in the ability to declare a state of exception by freeing the executive from legal constraints. This concept, as Giorgio Agamben later noted, links sovereignty to the suspension of the law, allowing the executive to exercise unlimited powers. Schmitt related this principle to Adolf Hitler's actions during the Third Reich, where the Weimar Constitution was never formally abrogated, but was constantly suspended by decrees such as the Reichstag Fire Decree of 1933.
Schmitt distinguishes between “commissar dictatorship,” which seeks to temporarily preserve the legal order, and “sovereign dictatorship,” which creates new constitutional realities. According to Schmitt, the exclusionary state not only suspends the law but can also redefine it, a view that justified Hitler's legal framework of totalitarian rule.
↑ What is political theology?
In Political Theology (1922), Carl Schmitt extended his authoritarian theories by famously asserting that “The sovereign is the one who decides on the exception.” Exclusion refers to a crisis that requires the suspension of the rule of law in the face of an exceptional state, defined as an existential threat to the state. Schmitt positioned the exception as a “boundary concept” that exists outside the normal legal order and criticized Hans Kelsen's normativist view of law as universally applicable norms, emphasizing its limitations in times of crisis.
In The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1923), Schmitt criticized liberal politics, arguing that the rational deliberation and transparency that were the foundations of liberalism were at odds with the realities of parliamentary decision-making dominated by party politics. He also challenged the liberal separation of powers, contrasting it with the supposed unity of rulers and ruled in a democracy - a position that continues to attract interest despite its authoritarian basis.
↑ Political science views
For Carl Schmitt, the “political” is a fundamental domain distinct from others such as economics or religion. It forms the existential basis of identity, defining relationships through a sharp distinction between 'friend' and 'enemy'. Unlike other domains that operate within a defined framework (such as profit in economics), politics involves the ultimate decision-making authority, determining how conflicts in any domain will be resolved when they become politically salient.
Schmitt argued that political concepts and symbols are inherently conflictual and are shaped by their application to particular situations. He called them “political,” arguing that terms such as state, sovereignty, or class only acquire meaning in concrete struggles. These terms become abstractions when detached from the context of real conflict, which culminates in the friend-enemy grouping that is the essence of politics.
Schmitt's definition of the enemy is existential rather than moral or aesthetic. The enemy represents the “other,” the fundamentally alien and different, with whom violent conflict is possible. This enmity is not necessarily related to nationality, but arises from any sufficiently intense confrontation that could threaten the stability of the state. Schmitt emphasized that the identification of enemies must serve the security of the state rather than moral considerations.
↑ Conclusions
Carl Schmitt's political and legal theories remain among the most provocative and controversial in modern intellectual history. His writings, deeply intertwined with his support for authoritarianism and his association with the Nazi regime, challenge conventional notions of liberal democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule of law.
Schmitt's concepts, such as the “state of exception,” the existential distinction between “friend” and “enemy,” and the polemical nature of political terms, were both influential and divisive. While his critique of parliamentary inefficiency and liberal cosmopolitanism reveals vulnerabilities in democratic governance, his authoritarian solutions and acceptance of totalitarian power have sparked enduring ethical and philosophical debates.